When one studies a Talmudic sugya, one must differentiate between the hava amina (the hypothetical assumption advanced but ultimately rejected by the Gemara) and the masqanah (the normative conclusion of the sugya).
To be sure, a lamdan will attempt to formulate and conceptualize the hava amina as well as the masqanah, and to recognize which elements of the supposed hava amina are retained in the masqanah. But a talmid hakham, having mastered the masa u-matan (back and forth) of the Gemara, must never forget that it is davka the masqanah, the conclusion of the Gemara, which is normative.

I believe that we should not forget these guidelines when we study the biblical narrative of the ‘Aqedah. The hava amina of the ‘Aqedah is clear: one must always submit to the will of the Almighty, even if the will of the Almighty is to commit, God forbid, a murder. The 19^th century Danish philosopher and theologian Soren Kierkegaard tried to imagine what Abraham had to go through to accomplish this submission; in his book Fear and Trembling he presents numerous imaginary hypotheses. But the conclusion of all
of them is the same: the ‘Aqedah constituted a “teleological suspension of the ethical:” Abraham had to realize that being truly religious means not doing what he thinks is correct but doing what God thinks is correct. And if that meant sacrificing the only son of his old age, so be it.

But what is the masqanah of the ‘Aqedah? Are we to understand that when “an angel of the L-Rd called to him from heaven” and said “Abraham! Abraham....!” and said, “Do not raise your hand against the boy or do anything to him. For now I know that you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your favored son, from Me… (Genesis 22:11-12)” the masqanah left the hava amina totally untouched?  Or is there a different conceptual substructure to the masqanah?
True, one must always submit to the will of the Almighty. But, indeed, what is the Will of the Almighty?”

One Jewish thinker who stressed the masqanah of the ‘Aqedah was Joseph ibn Kaspi. He was a medieval Provencal Maimonidean and interpreted numerous biblical narratives in the spirit of Maimonidean rationalism.  He was born in 1279/80 in Argentiere, in the province of Languedoc in southern France, and is presumed to have died shortly before 1345. In his work Gevia‘ Kesef, he devoted an entire chapter (XIV) to an analysis of the of ‘Aqedah . In the manner of the biblical commentary of his contemporary and compatriot, the 14^th century Provencal R. Levi ben Gershom (also known as Ralbag or Gersonides), ibn Kaspi cites a series of benefit (to‘alot) that the reader of the biblical passage of the ‘Aqedah derives from studying the text. What follows is part of his lengthy comment. (I have used the translation and notes of Basil Herring, Joseph ibn Kaspi’s Gevia‘ Kesef: A Study in Medieval Jewish Philosophic Bible Commentary  [New York, 1982], pp. 219-24.)

The third benefit…one that is most precious, is the greatest principle for which the (chapter) was recorded. It was the fact that (Abraham) was prevented from carrying it out at the point when he was approaching the act (of sacrifice of Isaac). For this reason, the verse is careful to say that when He, may He be blessed, commanded this act, it was only by way of a test. Heaven forbid that He would command in such a manner as to intend its fulfillment. The purpose (of the command) was to uproot, undermine, and weaken the established belief that was in the heart of the people that those who are punctiliously careful take of their children to make sacrifices to their gods.
Furthermore, while it is true that He who gave the Torah permitted them to take other forms of life (i.e., animals) as sacrifice to the L-RD our God, as an expression of guilt, Heaven forbid that the human species would be used for this purpose.
This even includes the prohibition against passing (a human being) through the fire (even without sacrificing him), as is seen from the careful omission of any mention of kindling of fire, even though the high priest would act in that manner (Cf. Leviticus 16:27, regarding the High Priest’s service on the Day of Atonement). While it does say earlier that “he took in his hand the fire,” (Genesis 22:13) this is avoided in the verse “and Abraham built the altar there, and laid the wood in order, and bound Isaac his son, and laid him on the altar on the wood (Genesis 22:9). Had this (verse) stated “And he placed the fire under the wood,” or “…on the altar,” it would have been understood by foolish people as indicating that Abraham was at least (able) to pass Isaac through the fire. (But even this act of “passing through the fire” without burning to death is prohibited.)

The significance (of the custom of sacrificing children) is known from the Torah and Prophets, in that the ultimate sacrifice in those generations was to offer their children as a sacrifice to their gods, whether that would be by passing them through the fire, or to burn them completely, or to slaughter them and cast their blood as a food offering to their gods. This is all evident to one who does not “sit at street-corners (yoshevei keranot).” One can find a specific instance of this in the Book of Kings (II Kings 3:27), where the king of Moab sacrificed his eldest son, which was certainly a burnt offering to his god. It is known that one of our sins was that our people were unable to overcome such beliefs, in spite of all the prophylactic measures used by the Torah to make us understand the matter.

Even Jephtah, who was not one of those considered wicked but only vain, in that he was not wise, actually meant to fulfill the will of the L-RD when he swore, saying, “Whatever comes out of the door of my house to meet me on my safe return from the Ammonites shall be the L-RD’s and shall be offered by me as a
burnt offering (Judges 11:31). The meaning of “shall be the L-RD’s” is not as Ibn Ezra explained. Jephtah did not consider the sacrifice of a human being an abomination to the L-RD, so that when he said this later, he was not specific, for it never occurred to him that it might be his daughter, as did in fact happen. His fate proves his lack of wisdom. For in spite of everything, had he been wise, he would have withdrawn his vow. Instead, he imagined that it (the consummation of his vow) was an act of great piety. While he
(undoubtedly) read this episode (in Genesis) in particular, having read it he was not aware of this final cause, for he considered the L-RD’s prevention of Abraham (from sacrificing his son) to be only an act of mercy on account of (Isaac’s being) an only son in (Abraham’s) old age. (So Jephtah thought that) whoever would carry this out would be more praiseworthy and pious, especially (for someone like) Jephtah, a young man in his prime. It is possible that Jephtah expected an angel to call out to him, “Do not raise your hand against the child,” and continued to wait for it.

So this foolish enthusiast (Jephtah) sacricied his only daughter in fire unto the L-RD, in a similar manner to what the wise Abraham began to do with his only son, and similar to the act of the king of Moab in sacrificing his eldest son to his god Chemosh, as well as similar to the acts of some of our people, who in their sin sacrificed to idols. Because Jephtah was one of our lesser leaders, the sages said (Rosh Ha-Shanah 25b),”Jephtah was in his generation like Samuel in his generation….”

In general, the Torah attempted to cure this serious disease that occurred in our people in those times, similar to the manner in which it is presented here…For this reason, he who gave the Torah spike at length in describing the offensive nature of this (child-sacrifice), when He said,  “also their sons and daughters do they burn in the fire to their gods (Deuteronomy 12:31), an act that was particularly associated with Molech (Leviticus 18:21; 20:3). For this reason too, the punishment for this sin is greater than all (other) sins, if sacrifice is made to others- quite the opposite of the thoughts of those who considered this child-sacrifice most appropriate for all people. It was enough-more than enough- that in one respect He permitted them to kill an animal, that which is our brother (species), the offspring of our father (genus that is known as) “living,” [hai] which is the category that most immediately encompasses us
humans and the animals.
But while this (sacrifice of animals) was permitted with conditions, it was not so with relation to the human species, for man was created in the image of God. Consequently, such worship entails the sin of murder and the sin of committing an abomination before the L-RD, as I have explained.

According to Joseph ibn Kaspi, the maskanah of the ‘Aqedah is life affirming. God wants us to serve Him in life, not by sacrificing other human beings. This dovetails with the biblical imperative ve-hai bahem- “and you shall live by them (i.e., through the observance of the biblical commandments). It also corresponds beautifully with Psalm 115:16-18:

The heavens
belong to the L-RD

But the earth He gave over to man.

The dead cannot praise the L-RD

Nor any who go down into silence.

But we will bless the L-RD

Now and forever.

Hallelujah.