The Rama (O.C.556) rules that although one only has to spend one fifth of his money to perform a mitzvah (extrapolating from the passage [Ketubot 50a] regarding charity), this does not apply to a prohibition, which one my not violate even at the cost of all of his money. This view (held by the Rashba, in Shittah Mekubetzet Bava Kama 9b, and Ran, Sukkah ch. 3) is based on the passage in the Talmud (Berakhot 54a and 61b) interpreting the obligation to love G-d “with all of your resources” as “with all of your money”. The Vilna Gaon (Y.D. 157), however, argues, and points out that the Talmud is referring to a stringency particular to idolatry; any other prohibition would not require such a sacrifice (see also Marcheshet, I, 43).

Several approaches are suggested in later works to defend the Rama’s position, primarily positing differences between the stringency demanded of idolatry and that of other prohibitions if the Rama is correct. The Tosfot Yom HaKippurim suggests that one who values his money more than his life, as the Talmud describes, would not be obligated to give up all of his money to avoid transgressing a prohibition. The Resp. Ateret Moshe (#92) posits that in the case of general transgressions, one is required to forfeit his money, but if he does not do so, he is not called a “sinner”; this is not true in the case of idolatry.

The Resp. Siftei Ani (II, 42) suggests that logically, all prohibitions would share the martyrdom requirement that idolatry has. However, the verse of “V’Chai bahem” teaches that one is not to give up his life to avoid transgressions; idolatry, though, is not included in this principle. As the verse refers to life, it is only martyrdom that is not required in avoiding prohibitions. For other purposes, the rules are the same; thus, all prohibitions require giving up all of one’s money, just as with idolatry.

The Torah Temimah (Bereishit 28:23) understands the Magen Avraham (O.C. 228:16) to be arguing with the Rama. He rules that one who fears that all of his money will be stolen from him, leaving him with nothing, may treat the situation as “pikuach nefesh”. However, as R. Herschel Schachter has observed, it appears the situation discussed by the Magen Avraham is one of literal pikuach nefesh, as the individual will be defenseless against threat.

The D’var Tzvi (commentary to Resp. M’kadshei Hashem, II, 26, #2) brings sources to prove that in a situation where the transgression will be violated in any event, there is no obligation to forfeit any money in attempting to prevent it. The Chatam Sofer (Responsa, C.M. 177) undertstands the notion of forfeiting one’s money to be addressed to the individual, who would then become supported by the community. If, however, the situation involves the entire community, there is no obligation for them to forfeit all their funds, and the situation is actually considered one of pikuach nefesh.