The Talmud (Pesachim 86a) discusses the status of the section above the Kodesh haKadoshim and introduces the general issue of the sanctity of roofs and upper areas above holy places. While the Talmud states the upper floors of the azarah were not sanctified, the Mordechai (Shabbat I, 228) writes, in the name of R. Meir, that the level above a shul should not be used for an undignified purpose on a regular basis. He notes two possible sources for this idea: the statement of the Talmud (Shabbat 11a) condemning the existence of structures higher than the shul, which is limited to structures that are put to use (according to some interpretations); and the statement of the Talmud (Pesachim, ibid) that the upper levels of the heikhal were sanctified, and the heikhal may be the best model for the synagogue, which is called “mikdash me’at”. This concept is recorded in Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 151:12), where it is stated that regular, undignified usage must be avoided, while other types of usage is an open question. Poskim discuss the relevance of this idea to modern synagogues that have apartments above them. The Magen Avraham (150:2) notes that the practice has been to build such apartments, despite the Shulchan Arukh’s ruling. Several possible leniencies may be relevant: a) In reference to the statement concerning structures higher than the shul, the Meiri (Shabbat 11a) writes that the only concern is regarding a structure that is high in order to be impressive. If the reason for the height is to allow for extra rooms, this would be permissible. It would emerge from his position (which is at variance with that of the Mordechai, cited above, and the Rosh, Shabbat, I, 23) that not only is it permitted to make use of the area higher than the shul, but that the utilitarian concern is itself a justification. This view would also seem to be consistent with the words of the Rambam (Hil. Tefilah 11:2). b) R. Natan Gestetner (Resp. L’Horot Natan, I, 8) notes, in reference to the concern based on the comparison to the heikhal, that grounds for leniency may exist if the above apartments are owned by different people than those involved with the shul. This is due to the principle of “ein adam oser davar sh’eino she’lo”, that one is unable to confer a status of “forbidden” (through intent) upon an object that is not his own. c) He notes as well that the Rambam (Hil. Beit HaBechirah 6:7) rules simply that roofs and above regions are not sanctified, and makes no distinction between the azarah and the heikhal. The Tzlach (Pesachim 86a) explains his position as being that the only upper compartments that would be sanctified are those that open up into the heikhal itself. If so, the concept would be of limited practical relevance (see also Resp. D’var Yehoshua, II, 20:16). d) The Rama (O.C. 151:12) quotes, in the name of the Mahari Veil, that the prohibition to make personal use of the roof of a synagogue would apply only to a situation where the building was originally constructed as a synagogue, and not in a situation where a pre-existing building was later utilized for that purpose. Further, the Taz (#4) adds that if an apartment was built at the same time, the area where it is located was perforce never sanctified. The Pri Megadim, Mishbetzot Zahav, 4, understands this to be a function of “t’nai”, conditional sanctification. Nonetheless, the Magen Avraham (#18) recommends avoiding such an arrangement, and the Taz himself attributes great misfortune to residing above a synagogue. R. Gestetner (L’Horot Natan, I, 9), noting that some of the above leniencies only address one of the two issues, concludes that the safest approach is that the initial construction of a synagogue that will have personal usage above should be done without the intent of conferring the sanctity of a synagogue structure at all. The Mishnah Berurah, in the Biur Halakhah, asserts that the Shulchan Arukh’s possibility that other types of usage (other than regular, undignified) may be permissible above a synagogue is ony relevant to activities taking place inside of a room, and thus concealed from public view. However, on the roof, where activities are visible, there is greater stringency (as indicated by the Mishnah in Megilah 28, which he cites). R. Shmuel Wosner (Resp. Shevet HaLevi, VI, 18; see also I, 27; IX, 28; X, 35) takes issue with this assumption, noting the Shulchan Arukh’s sourcing in the words of the Mordechai, which compared the synagogue to the heikhal. The Maharit (Responsa, Y.D., 4) challenged the Mordechai, assuming that the heikhal was uniquely affected by Scriptural decree (gezerat ha-katuv). In any event, in the case of the heikhal an attic was more sanctified than the roof, which only had sanctity on a lower level, comparable to the rest of the Holy City. He concludes that undignified activity is prohibited objectively, regardless of visibility. In another responsum (V, 21) R. Wosner adds to the analysis by positing the question of how sanctity would attach to the roof of the azarah. He considers to possibilities: a) that at the time of the initial sanctification of the azarah, the air above it was explicitly included; b) the airspace was never explicitly sanctified, but draws sanctity from being exposed to the azarah. He suggests that this issue is implicit in a dispute between the Ra’avad and Tosafot. The Ra’avad (in the end of the first chapter of Massekhet Tamid) writes that the area above the roof of the azarah, that is considered unsanctified, is only treated as such as far as what was in place during the initial sanctification (which then stopped at the roof). However, something built afterwards would be inserting itself into a continually sanctified area. Tosafot (Makkot 12a), however, were of the opinion that even something built later would not be considered sanctified. (See also Resp. Minchat Yitzchak IV, 43 and VII, 8; Resp. Maharsham, I, 35, Resp. Imrei Yosher, II, 12; Resp. Divrei Chaim O.C. 3; Resp. Beit Yitzchak, Y.D. II, kuntres acharon 1:5; Resp. Beit Shlomo, O.C. I, 28; Resp. Levushei Mordechai, 4:5; Beit HaOtzar, I, 22:23.)