I. Any student of the “Brisker method” instantly recognizes the terms “Cheftza” (object) and “Gavra” (person). These terms are used in contemporary lomdus to categorize halakhot, as pertaining specifically either to an individual’s behavior (“a din in the gavra”), or to the status of an object (or, a third possibility, an action, or “ma’aseh”). However, in the Talmud, this distinction is only really expressly articulated in one context. The Talmud (Nedarim 2b) contrasts a neder, which assigns prohibited status to an object, with a shvu’ah, which regulates the behavior of an individual. Outside of this context, the proper categorizations seem somewhat vague and even interchangeable. Any Torah prohibition, for example, could be labeled in either manner: the object is prohibited to the individual, and the individual is prohibited regarding the object. This exact frustration was expressed by the Avnei Nezer (Responsa, Orach Chaim 37), who suggested the following principle. A prohibition on the “gavra” means that the transgression would impact and demean the individual; it is the “gavra” that is exalted above the offending item. Thus, most of the Torah’s prohibitions would fall into this category. In fact, some rishonim, such as the Ritva (Nedarim 13b, s.v. Chulin, and Sh’vuot 20b s.v. mai ta’ama ) as well as the Ran (Nedarim18a, s.v. hilkach) , maintain that the prohibitions of the Torah are indeed, as a rule, “gavra” prohibitions. (This is also consistent with the fact that the terminology and concept obligating the Jewish people to keep the Torah is that of a shvu’ah.) A prohibition of the “cheftza” would mean that the object is exalted, and that the individual, by appropriating that object, is demeaning it. Accordingly, this category is essentially only for sanctified objects. However, the process of a neder dictates that the object being forbidden is attached to something sanctified (hatfasah). Thus, neder prohibitions, by association, are also prohibitions on the cheftza. (See R. Ya’akov Traube’s Responsa Avnei Ya’akov, 158-163, for extensive comments on the Avnei Nezer’s position). II. Other acharonim, however, understand the distinction differently. They assume that a “cheftza” prohibition connotes an object that is inherently negative, while a “gavra” prohibition forbids an individual from an activity with a neutral object. Consequentially, it has been suggested that any time an object is not completely prohibited, but possesses elements of permissibility, it must not be a “cheftza” prohibition. Three examples of those exceptions are listed below, and are considered by R. Yosef Engel, in his Atvan d’Orayta, (#10): a) Something that is prohibited at some times and permitted at others, such as food on Yom Kippur. While this is the strong implication of the Talmud Yerushalmi, R. Engel considers the validity of this assumption to be the subject of a dispute between the Yerushalmi and the Bavli. b) Rabbinical prohibitions: as the items involved were permitted before the relevant Rabbinic decree, it is difficult to assume that they changed status after the decree. This is particularly so because it is likely that Rabbinic authority is directed at the individual Jew, who is obligated to comply, but not to determining the status of objects. In this case, R. Engel argues against this assumption, noting midrashic sources that G-d endorses the decrees of the Rabbis, and assigns a new status to an object that they prohibit. c) Prohibitions that apply to some Jews, but not to others, such as Terumah. Elsewhere (Beit Ha-Otzar, I, 127), R. Yosef Engel asserts that a prohibited action, such as melakhah on Shabbat, can never assume a status as a “cheftzah” and thus must be termed a “gavra” prohibition. III. Many classic debates in the Talmud and afterward have been tied to the general question of whether the Torah is addressing the cheftza or the gavra. One prominent example of this is the debate between R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish (Yoma 74a) as to the status of an item that is prohibited to be eaten, but in this case is below the punishable measurement (chatzi shiur). According to Reish Lakish, this item is prohibited by rabbinic law, and permitted according to the Torah. This explanation would thus maintain that Reish Lakish sees the prohibition as pertaining to the “gavra”, leaving the object neutral. R. Yochanan, who asserts a biblical prohibition, would maintain that the item is inherently negative, and thus any quantity is prohibited, even if not punishable. (See Tziyyunim L’Torah, 22; Resp. Maharash, III, petichah, 4; Minchat Chein, I, 27; see also Natan Piryo, Bava Metzia 53b, for an application of this idea to the debate about Bitul min b’mino). IV. Many acharonim suggest that various concepts apply either to a cheftzah prohibition or a gavra prohibition, but not both. For example, the Resp. Kol Aryeh (#4) writes that the principle of “mitzvah haba’ah b’aveirah”, disqualifying a mitzvah performed through the violation of a transgression, only applies to a “cheftza” prohibition. Conversely, the principle of “aseh docheh lo ta’aseh”, giving priority to a positive mitzvah over a prohibition when the two are in conflict, only applies if the prohibition is on the “gavra”. Using these two assumptions, he explains the rule that a neder takes effect even in contradiction of a mitzvah (e.g., one who prohibits himself from all pairs of tefilin) while a shv’uah does not (e.g., one who swears not to put on tefilin). Since the shv’uah theoretically creates a “gavra” prohibition, the rule of “aseh docheh lo ta’aseh” is in place, and the mitzvah is dominant. In the case of a neder, which creates a “cheftza” prohibition, that rule would not apply, and “mitzvah haba’ah b’aveirah” would apply, invalidating any mitzvah that would be performed under those circumstances (as the Rambam states in his commentary to the Mishnah).