Li'zchus my beloved friends

R' Moshe Yehuda Hanus

R' Shmuel Stein 

R' Chaim Schreck 

R' Eytan Feldman

R' Avromi Somers

For much success in all they do together with their families   

There is a question if the זיקה [linkage] between the יבם and יבמה flows from the original kiddushin of the late husband or it is a new חלות [change in halachic status] with the brother. 

In the words of Rabbeinu:

"אם עיקר המציאות דיבמה משום דכי גזרה התורה דבאין זרע לבעלה ויש לו אח עדיין יש עליה זיקת המת כי לא נפטרה עדיין מבעלה הראשון מכל וכל או יבום הוי דבר חדש".

According to the first approach, we see something remarkable: The marriage continues in a sense even AFTER the demise of the husband. 

Or in a different formulation:

"אם ר"ל דהתורה גזרה שאם יש אח בהרגע של המיתה בלא זרע עדיין לא נפקעו קנייני המת שיש על האשה ונשארת בגדר האישות של המת. ויש בזה כמה מחלוקת גבי זיקה אם ר"ל של החי או של המת."

The Mishna says in Yevamos [104a]

חלצה בלילה חליצתה כשרה ורבי אלעזר פוסל:

 If a woman performed ḥalitza at night, her ḥalitza is valid, but Rabbi Elazar invalidates it. 

והכא בהא קמיפלגי מר סבר חליצה כתחלת דין דמיא ומר סבר חליצה כגמר דין דמיא

And here, with respect to performing ḥalitza at night they disagree about this issue: One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that ḥalitza is considered like the commencement of judgment of monetary cases, and one Sage, the first tanna, holds that ḥalitza is considered like the verdict of a monetary judgment, and therefore it may also be conducted at night.

The terms "תחילת דין" and "גמר דין" express the essence of זיקה. The תחילת דין means a new connection i.e. the זיקה of the living brother and the חליצה breaks off this new connection. גמר דין denotes 
an old connection i.e. the זיקה engendered by the late husband [I am also often a "late husband" but I am working on it...] which is severed by the חליצה.

Let us see how this issue is expressed in the shkla vi-tarya ["give and take" in Polish] of the Gemara [Gittin 83b]: 

גופא מודה ר"א במגרש אשתו ואמר לה הרי את מותרת לכל אדם חוץ מפלוני והלכה ונישאת לאחד מן השוק ונתארמלה או נתגרשה שמותרת לזה שנאסרה עליו

The Gemara discusses the matter itself that was mentioned above in passing: With regard to a case where a man divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the general public and was subsequently widowed or divorced from him, Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is now permitted to marry the man whom she was initially prohibited from marrying.

השיב ר"ש בר אלעזר תשובה לדברי ר"א היכן מצינו שזה אוסר וזה מתיר

The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon bar Elazar raised a refutation to Rabbi Eliezer’s statement: Where do we find a situation where this person prohibits something and that other person permits it? How can the first husband render the woman prohibited from marrying a certain man and her second husband render her permitted to do so after his death or their divorce?

ולא והרי יבמה דבעל אוסר ויבם מתיר

The Gemara questions this refutation: Is there not such a situation? But isn’t there the case of a yevama, a woman whose husband dies childless, and he deems her forbidden to other men while she waits for his brother, her yavam, to perform levirate marriage with her, and the yavam, after performing levirate marriage with her, deems her permitted in the event of divorce or his death?

Now the Gemara understands that it is the זיקה with her late husband that forbids her. But the Gemara responds that this is not so:

התם יבם הוא קא אסר לה דאי מבעל הא שריא וקיימא

There, it is the yavam who renders her forbidden, since if not for the yavam, i.e., if her deceased husband did not have any brothers, she would have already been released from her bond to her husband and permitted to marry any man. It is only the existence of the yavam that prevents her from marrying other men. Therefore, it is he who renders her permitted.

So the conclusion is that the זיקה is a new מצב with the living brother. 

 See also Kiddushin 14a "יבם אוסרה, יבם שרי לה". Same as the conclusion of the Gemara in Gittin. 

But from Kiddushin 9b we see the opposite understanding:

ור' יוחנן האי ובעלה מאי עביד ליה ההוא מיבעי ליה זו נקנית בביאה ואין אמה העבריה נקנית בביאה

And Rabbi Yoḥanan, who maintains that the mode of betrothal through intercourse is derived from the verse: “If a man be found lying with a married woman [beulat ba’al]” (Deuteronomy 22:22), what does he do with this verse: “When a man takes a woman and engages in sexual intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 24:1)? The Gemara answers: He requires that verse for a different halacha, as he maintains that it teaches that this woman can be acquired through intercourse, but a Hebrew maidservant cannot be acquired through intercourse. 

ס"ד אמינא תיתי בק"ו מיבמה ומה יבמה שאין נקנית בכסף נקנית בביאה זו שנקנית בכסף אינו דין שנקנית בביאה

As it might enter your mind to say: Let the halacha of a Hebrew maidservant be derived through an a fortiori inference from the halacha of a yevama: Just as a yevama, who cannot be acquired through money at all, nevertheless can be acquired through intercourse, which indicates that the ability of an act of sexual intercourse to effect acquisition is greater than that of money, is it not logical that this Hebrew maidservant, who can be acquired through money, can also be acquired through intercourse?

מה ליבמה שכן זקוקה ועומדת

The Gemara rejects this opinion: What is unique about a yevama is that she is bound and standing waiting for the yavam, i.e., there is already a connection between them. Perhaps it is for this reason that intercourse enables a yavam to acquire a yevama, and the same cannot be said of a maidservant. 

Rashi [4a] explains that she is bound to the Yavam because of the marriage to her late husband.

שכן זקוקה ועומדת לזה מחמת קידושי המת.  

THERE IS SO MUCH MORE TO SAY!!!

ועוד חזון למועד בני נדר בעזרת השם!!😄😄