The legends of Rav Chaim Brisker’s zeal for life have come to the fore as of late. Two particular examples come to mind, one related to Yom Kippur and one related to Shabbat. In Halakhic Man, Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik describes how Rav Chaim (his grandfather) did not believe that one should feed someone ill who is in danger on Yom Kippur in the format of “shiurim,” small measures over the course of several minutes. Rav Chaim believed that if someone is in danger, fasting is suspended on Yom Kippur and that person should eat a full meal necessary to restore/maintain their health. In fact, when Rav Chaim’s son (the Rav’s father), Rav Moshe Soloveitchik, was about to begin in a new rabbinic position, Rav Chaim said to him, “I command you to follow my view regarding a sick person in danger on the Day of Atonement, for it is an absolute truth” (34-35). In another scenario, the Rav was ill on Shabbos when he was an infant, and a doctor came to examine. Rav Chaim asked if the doctor needed more light; the doctor equivocated. He then asked if it would be more helpful if there would be additional light; then the doctor said, yes. So Rav Chaim instructed someone else in the room to adjust the light, but this individual, hearing that the doctor did not say it was absolutely essential. At that point, Rav Chaim berated him as an ignoramus, a heretic! What is going on in both of these anecdotes? I do not have a citation, but I once heard that Rav Chaim defined his approach as not being lenient on hilchos Shabbos or hilchos Yom Kippur, but rather being stringent on pikuach nefesh.

            Much of the basis for many halachic decisions that have been made over the last two months comes from a verse in this week’s parasha, Acharei Mot-Kedoshim, so it is worthwhile to explore the pasuk due its timeliness. The Torah says: וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם אֶת חֻקֹּתַי וְאֶת מִשְׁפָּטַי אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה אֹתָם הָאָדָם וָחַי בָּהֶם אֲנִי יְקֹוָק (Vayikra 18:5). “And you shall observe My statutes and my ordinances, which an individual shall do and live by them. I am the Lord.” The Gemara in Yoma (85b) tries to find a source for the mandate of pikuach nefesh, and a few solutions are offered. Shmuel, however, says it comes from this verse “‘and live by them’ – and not die by them,” and this is the understanding embraced by the Gemara. A lot of ink is spilled regarding the halachic obligations pertaining to pikuach nefesh, particularly in this time, but I would explore not just how Judaism says we should act in this situation, but also how we should relate to the act of saving lives in this situation. Most good people think that saving lives is a noble endeavor – but what about when it causes inconvenience or goes against our personal desires? The Torah tells us that pikuach nefesh should be an act of love and joy.

            Why is it that Rav Chaim was so stringent on pikuach nefesh? He said he believed that his position as absolute truth, but he was obviously more stringent than others might have been. He dismissed feeding someone ill in shiurim, even though other halachic authorities believe that was the proper halacha. The doctor said that he did not necessarily need more light, so maybe it was not really an urgent pikuach nefesh. Why did he berate the individual who hesitated to adjust the light as a heretic? If the doctor did not need the extra light, does it not make sense to equivocate slightly whether one may do something not directly instrumental towards pikuach nefesh? Rav Chaim learned this from Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 2:3:

הא למדת שאין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם אלא רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם

From this you may infer that the laws of the Torah are not meant to wreak vengeance upon the world, but to bestow on it mercy, kindliness, and peace.

What else would we have thought? Do we not assume that the Torah is a gift that encourages life and joy? We say when we put the Torah away דרכיה דרכי נועם וכל נתיבותיה שלום – its ways are ways of pleasantness and its path is peace! Still, living a life commanded by God can be demanding and requires devoted mesirut nefesh on some level. What’s more is that there were, in fact, those who do not allow the Torah to be read outside its literal context. One may not interpret the verses. Since the Torah does not explicitly say “you may violate mitzvot to save a life,” one might think that it is not legitimate to do so, as the Talmud interprets. Too bad, one must obey the word of God at all times, this line of thinking is. But here we see that the debate between Karaite and rabbinic Judaism is not just an academic discussion, but it is a matter of life and death at times. But beyond that, it shows a big disparity in terms of the value of life. As Rambam highlights, no Torah given by God could be one that is not full of mercy, kindness, and peace. We learn from our verse, the laws interpreted out of it, that even as we must follow mitzvot, God loves the Jewish people. God would not give us mitzvot all the way up to the point that even a mitzvah as important as Shabbat would warrant giving up life. Inasmuch as God treats human life as a priority, we must walk in God’s path and love life as much as God does. We drop all other priorities and save a life because we are also meant to love mercy, kindness, and peace.

            Or Ha-Chayim (R. Chayim ibn Attar, 18th century Morroco) notes that our verse (Vayikra 18:5) is actually very similar to the verse before it. They both admonish an individual to follow mitzvot, and they both identify God as Commander. But there are two significant differences. The first verse identifies God as אני ה' אלקיכם, while the second verse only says אני ה'. Meanwhile, the second verse adds וחי בהם, and you shall live by them. Why these two similar verses, and why the differences? On a halachic level, the first verse, without וחי בהם, pertains to the mitzvot that require giving up one’s life – the three cardinal sins, while the second verse pertains to all other mitzvot in which we apply pikuach nefesh. Additionally, the name of God “אלקים” is identified with justice – one who perceives God from this perspective alone serves God with fear. But God is identified by the attribute of mercy alone in the next verse, since there, God is just אני ה'. Someone who understands that God is merciful serves God with love and wishes to perform mitzvot out of a love for what is good. The reason why it says וחי בהם in this verse is that this person does not just get olam ha-ba as reward, but his present avodat Hashem is itself rewarding. Living a life of observance that contains God’s mercy embodies love of life itself. To take this a step further, the differences between these verses highlight the role of pikuach nefesh itself. When it comes to the three cardinal sins, God is identified with the attribute of justice; for these mitzvot alone, the line must be held. But when it comes to all other mitzvot, we emphasize God’s mercy because it is through mercy and kindness that we practice mitzvot. It is here where we emphasize that, as Rambam said, the Torah is not meant to be vengeance but mercy and kindness. We further see from here how saving a life is not just another mitzvah, but it defines God’s essence as kind and merciful. Only a person who understand this can serve God with love and can carry out mitzvot from the vantage point of love directed at both God and other human beings.

            Should we need the Torah itself to tell us that saving a life is a paramount value? Is that not obvious to human nature? In many cases, it is. But our experience of the current pandemic highlights the challenges. Prolonged periods of no shul, no social outlets, the inability to celebrate smachot, and the inability to be together in times of loss and tragedy make it hard to place saving lives over all else, especially when the effects are indirect and not immediate. We might be willing to take certain risks to enhance these mitzvot. Furthermore, we see the unfortunate effect this has had on people’s lives and our economy. Regarding the story of the Tower of Bavel, the midrash says that in fact, economics outweighed life. If a brick fell, they mourned; if a person died, they did not beat an eyelash. The Torah pushes back on this cruel attitude – loss of profit does not nearly matter as much as loss of life. It is one thing to protest the loss of work when it itself turns into a pikuach nefesh issue due to lack of ability to provide basic needs. However, if attitude towards lightening social distancing measures is only a means towards giving other people ‘normalcy’ or ‘happiness,’ we take the stricter approach because if God is merciful enough to allow us to desecrate Shabbat and Yom Kippur to save a life, we must embody that trait of mercy towards other people as well. Likewise, protesting social distancing measures as an infringement on rights, as some have, is antithetical to what the Torah teaches. First, because the Torah does not believe in rights as much as it believes in responsibilities; we have a responsibility to care for the lives of all of those around us. Second, such an attitude is the opposite of mercy – instead of saying that “it is my right to do what I wish, regardless of how it may somehow affect your ability to live,” the Torah says we must be stringent on pikuach nefesh. But the reason is not because the Torah inherently wants to restrict us and to be dejected – it is because the Torah wants to teach us the values of love and kindness!

            Vachai ba-hem – a perspective that views saving lives as a labor of love and as a manifestation of God’s mercy is the one that gives us chizuk to stay home even when it is most difficult, and be’ezrat Hashem the rewards of observing this mitzvah with love will be plentiful in the long run.