Rabbinic tradition establishes that the haftarah read in conjunction with the weekly Torah portion is thematically linked to the Biblical reading, thereby contributing to an enhanced understanding and appreciation of the parashah (see, for example, Tur 428). In this respect, the very choice of a companion haftarah may constitute an important dimension of parshanut and may illuminate important rabbinic perspectives on the various motifs that invariably intersect and occasionally vie for priority or emphasis in any particular parashah. The haftarah companion may illuminate the parashah in various ways: by reinforcing a central motif or providing an insightful parallel; by serving as an important contrast, corrective, or counterbalance; or simply by providing vital perspective on the subtle or complex themes in the parashah.

In general, the thematic connection between the parashah and its haftarah is self-evident. A curious or even problematic pairing, especially in light of the wide range of alternatives, challenges us to reevaluate our previous assessment of the parashah’s central ideas. The effort to comprehend Chazal’s haftarah selection in such cases deepens our understanding of the parashah and enhances our appreciation of Chazal’s wisdom.

The pairing of Yechezkel chapter 22 (vv. 1–16) with Parashat Kedoshim is difficult and intriguing. The focus of Kedoshim is the repeated theme of “kedoshim tiheyu; ve-hitkadishtem; vi-heyitem li kedoshim” (Vayikra 19:2; 20:7; 20:26), which projects and is anchored in man’s idealistic capacity for imitatio Dei (“ki kadosh ani Hashem Elokeikhem”). The parashah conveys that Jews are commanded not only to observe the norms of the Torah but to internalize Torah values and cultivate a persona of sanctity and holiness. According to the Ramban’s celebrated interpretation, this charge also demands that we cohere with the spirit of halakhic law and avoid the exploitation of technical allowances that may constitute an abuse of the halakhic system. Chazal further assert that “gufei Torah” (essential religious tenets) are delineated in this parashah that correspond to the Ten Commandments.

These ambitious and lofty motifs are conjoined with a bracing, frightening, pessimistic haftarah that highlights Am Yisrael’s capacity for moral and ethical deviance (“to’eivah,” see 22:2, 11), especially their immersion in, and responsibility for, bloodshed (22:2, 3, 4, 6, 12, 13), and the consequent deterioration of Jerusalem into the “city of blood.” The navi is repeatedly challenged (such as in 22:2 “ha-tishpot ha-tishpot et ir ha-damim”) to confront and adjudicate a whole litany of the nation’s heinous crimes. The navi proceeds (22:3) to delineate the natural consequences (“ir shofekhet dam be-tokhah lavo itah; be-damekh…ashamt, be-gilulayikh…tameit, va-takrivi yamayikh va-tavo ad shenotayikh”) of the nation’s religious abuses, as well as Hashem’s imposed punishments (“al kein netatikh cherpah ve-kalasah le-kol ha-aratzot”), followed by a list of specific violations that apparently justify such a bleak prognosis.

This haftarah, then, graphically depicts the debased state of Kelal Yisrael and outlines the terrifying consequences of the nation’s horrific conduct. What does this choice for haftarah reflect about Chazal’s understanding of the concept of kedoshim tiheyu? What profound objective justifies the jarring juxtaposition of these seemingly incongruent themes?

There is an added dimension to the mystery and difficulty of this conjunction. The accepted halakhic view is that when the two portions of Acharei Mot and Kedoshim are read in tandem, the haftarah of Acharei Mot (“Halo ki-Vnei Khushiyyim” (Amos 9:7–15)), rather than that of Kedoshim (Yechezkel ch. 22), is recited. The Rema (O.C. 428:8) citing the authority of the Mordechai (Megillah, no. 831) notes that this ruling is the exception to the general principle that the second Torah reading determines the choice of haftarah. While the Levush disputes this view and insists on the basis of the standard halakhic protocol that Yechezkel chapter 22 would be read for Acharei Mot-Kedoshim, the later poskim (Bach, Magen Avraham, Machatzit Ha-Shekel, etc.) almost uniformly embrace the Mordechai-Rema exception. What justifies this striking exception? What are the underlying implications of this unusual ruling regarding Chazal’s perspective on “kedoshim tiheyu”?

The Mordechai, himself, attributes the preference and priority of the Acharei Mot haftarah (Amos ch. 9) to the impulse to avoid the unpleasant theme of Jerusalem’s deviant conduct (“to’eivot Yerushalayim”), which predominates Yechezkel chapter 22. This perspective underlies the position of R. Akiva Eiger, as well. He ruled (O.C. 428) that when Amos chapter 9 is eclipsed on Parashat Acharei Mot by the haftarah of “Machar Chodesh” (when the Shabbat of Parashat Acharei Mot precedes Rosh Chodesh), Amos chapter 9 would replace Yechezkel chapter 22 the next week as the companion haftarah for Kedoshim.

Moreover, the emphasis in Amos chapter 9 on Kelal Yisrael’s singular destiny as a chosen nation and its ultimate triumphant redemption (especially according to those commentators – Radak, Metzudat David, and Malbim [in contrast to Rashi and Ibn Ezra] – who perceive this to be the unambiguous theme throughout the haftarah, already conveyed by the initial comparison with Benei Khushiyyim even when Kelal Yisrael is unworthy) may be significant. This thoroughly optimistic posture establishes Amos chapter 9 as an extremely attractive and pleasant alternative to the depressing and disturbing Yechezkel chapter 22, perhaps justifying the breach in accepted halakhic protocol.

Some authorities (Levush, Machatzit Ha-Shekel, O.C. 428) posit that Amos chapter 9’s preference as the haftarah for the joined parashiyot of Acharei Mot and Kedoshim is also due to its equal relevance to both parashiyot. Moreover, it is conceivable that the inspiring Amos prophecy about the ultimate redemption and triumph of Kelal Yisrael provides such a crucial counterbalance to the potentially calamitous dangers of the ubiquitous “to’eivot” behavior forewarned at the conclusion of Acharei Mot (Vayikra 18:24–30) that it is deemed indispensable. Thus, the contribution of Amos chapter 9 to Acharei Mot outweighs Yechezkel chapter 22’s enhancement of Kedoshim. However, neither of these views would sufficiently explain R. Akiva Eiger’s conclusion that Amos chapter 9 should supersede Yechezkel chapter 22 and should be read in conjunction with Kedoshim, even in the absence of Acharei Mot.

In any case, while these perspectives may explain the occasional replacement of Yechezkel chapter 22 by Amos chapter 9 as the haftarah for Parashat Kedoshim, they actually deepen the mystery as to why the painful and pessimistic Yechezkel chapter 22 was initially selected as the prime companion to Parashat Kedoshim, particularly considering the plethora of other options. If Chazal felt discomfort or even just ambivalence linking the ambitious ideal of “kedoshim tiheyu” with the bleak depiction and devastating critique of the eroded religious state of Kelal Yisrael reflected in the chapter in Yechezkel, why did they overcome this reticence and select it as the default haftarah of Parashat Kedoshim? Evidently, notwithstanding its severity and unpleasantness, this section in Yechezkel also acutely illuminates some critical dimension of Parashat Kedoshim in a manner that enhances our understanding and appreciation of the themes of that parashah.

To better comprehend the choice of Yechezkel chapter 22 (and possibly the exceptions, as well), we should briefly analyze its content and examine its link with Parashat Kedoshim. Like Parashat Kedoshim, a striking range of diverse infractions, seemingly disconnected from one another, register in this section in Yechezkel. While the list appears to be random, further analysis demonstrates that these prohibitions encompass the full range of human and religious activity. Moreover, in the aggregate, this group of halakhic violations reflects a profound flaw in the holistic religious persona that ideally should be shaped by the ambitious charge of “kedoshim tiheyu.” The range and content of violations in Yechezkel bespeak of a pattern of fundamental neglect and even rejection of religious commitment and spiritual focus that is both a consequence and further cause of a narrow view of halakhic obligation that denies the concept of a broader halakhic personality exemplified by the concept of “kedoshim tiheyu.”

This perspective and the link to the theme of “kedoshim tiheyu” is supported by the authoritative commentators on Yechezkel, as well. Rashi (Yechezkel 22:7) specifically notes that the litany of violations that form the navi’s indictment of Kelal Yisrael in this harsh rebuke actually parallels the proscriptions of Parashat Kedoshim. This includes the abuse of parents, insensitivity to converts, exploitation of widows and orphans, disregard or disrespect for kodashim, desecration of the Shabbat, character defamation, various arayot (sexual impropriety) violations, bribery, and ribbit (collection of interest on loans). Rashi (22:5) posits that the unusual phrase “temei’at Hashem,” which focuses on the antinomian persona of the transgressor, contrasts sharply with the Torah’s aspiration of being an “am kadosh banim le-Yotzram” (an idea expressed in Devarim 14:1–2). R. Yosef Kara, the Biblical exegete, expands this insight, arguing (in his comment on Yechezkel 22:5) that “temei’at Hashem” expressly contradicts the avowed aim of personal sanctity and, more ambitiously, a sanctified persona, rooted in the imperative of “ve-hitkadishtem vi-heyitem kedoshim ki kadosh ani Hashem” (Vayikra 11:44), reinforcing the link with the primary theme of Parashat Kedoshim. Later in his commentary (Yechezkel 22:12), he too links the violations of this chapter to the prohibitions of Parashat Kedoshim and he explicitly identifies the status of “temei’at Hashem” as the antithesis of one who observes and internalizes the mitzvot associated with the parashah and concept of “kedoshim tiheyu.” [See, also, Radak’s interesting link (in his commentary on Yechezkel 22:3) between Kedoshim and Yechezkel.]

In light of this analysis, we might reassess some puzzling difficulties posed by Yechezkel chapter 22. While the extensive record of noteworthy transgressions certainly constitute an exceedingly serious breach of halakhic behavior, one might still question the proportionality of the devastating consequences portended by the prophet. Moreover, the ubiquitous references to “shefikhut damim” (shedding of blood) seem exaggerated when one considers the identity and character of the crimes that are subsumed under this most severe category of halakhic violation and misconduct. The prophet applies this most brutal appellation also to strong-armed rulers (22:6), gossip mongers (22:9), and solicitors of bribery (22:12). While these transgressions are certainly exceedingly improper, their designation as “shefikhat damim” seems incommensurate with the crime, especially given the initial formulation of “ir ha-damim” (city of blood), which established the very harsh tone at the outset of this chapter. We have already alluded to the fact that the phrase “temei’at Hashem” (22:5) stands out as an unusual characterization.

Yet, precisely these intriguing anomalies and the apparent hyperbole may serve as a clue that further illuminates the link between the concept of “kedoshim tiheyu” and this harsh indictment of Kelal Yisarel.

As previously noted, the imperative of “kedoshim tiheyu” eschews halakhic narrowness and compartmentalization. “Kedoshim tiheyu” forcefully asserts the interaction of different dimensions of halakhic life and the need for consistency and a comprehensive commitment. The cultivation of a sanctified persona that stems from, but also transcends the performance of, individual halakhic norms, regulates the interaction of diverse halakhic spheres, and protects against abuses that can spiral into an systemic erosion of commitment and performance. The parallel of Yechezkel chapter 22 dramatically demonstrates that this ambitious ideal is not merely a noble spiritual aspiration or a supererogatory (“lifnim mi-shurat ha-din”) halakhic luxury, but is, in fact, an indispensable perspective on halakhic life that is neglected at great peril. The concepts of “mitzvah goreret mitzvah” (a mitzvah leading to, or causing, another mitzvah to occur) and its negative counterpart (“aveirah goreret aveirah” – an aveirah leading to, or causing, another aveirah to occur) highlight the interdependence of halakhic life and the impact of spiritual momentum in the halakhic realm.

When individuals, and especially the nation, refuse to embrace the vision of an enriching destiny of “mamlekhet kohanim ve-goy kadosh” anchored in “kedoshim tiheyu,” dire consequences may ensue beyond dashed expectations of potential spiritual greatness. Yechezkel chapter 22 catalogues how neglect and abuse of seemingly unrelated spheres of halakhic life spiral into the spiritual equivalent of “to’eivah” and “shefikhut damim,” producing “temei’at Hashem.” The evocative, seemingly exaggerated imagery used by the prophet precisely capture the fragility and interdependence of spiritual life. Thus, while the grim repercussions and graphic depiction of Kelal Yisrael’s crimes and failures are distasteful, this chapter profoundly underscores and projects the vital importance of “kedoshim tiheyu,” thus establishing it as the appropriate choice for the haftarah of Parashat Kedoshim.

The Malbim (Yechezkel 22:9) perceives the three references to shefikhut damim (22:6, 9, 12) as corresponding to the three vices (kavod-nesi’im [v. 6]; kinah-rakhil [v. 9]; ta’avah-shochad [v. 12]) that drive man from the world (Pirkei Avot). This perspective reinforces the notion that the infractions are not merely independent transgressions, but constitute a pattern of halakhically self-destructive conduct that fundamentally contravenes the principle of halakhic values and the cultivation of a halakhically exemplary character. The equation between these halakhic character themes and shefikhat damim in Yechezkel chapter 22 powerfully affirms the vital role of “kedoshim tiheyu.”

Why, then, is Yechezkel chapter 22 abandoned when Kedoshim is conjoined with Acharei Mot? Perhaps because the capacity for spiritual erosion and even moral catastrophe due to the momentum of sin, the neglect of halakhic integrity, and the failure to develop a consistent halakhic persona, is already effectively documented precisely in the final verses of Acharei Mot that transition into the theme of “kedoshim tiheyu.” As previously alluded to, the Torah in that context (Vayikra 18:24–30) repeatedly (4 times) employs the terminology of “to’eivah” to graphically depict the nation’s devastating spiritual decline in consequence of its abandonment of kedushah and its adoption of the alternative life style of other cultures. The Torah (Vayikra 18:3) warns that the paradigms of “ma’aseih Eretz Mitzrayim” and “ma’aseih Eretz Kena’an” are not only personally and nationally counterproductive, but also metaphysically afflict or poison the physical-spiritual environment of Eretz Yisrael (18:25, 28). The Torah (Vayikra 18:25, 28) dramatically underscores the transcendence of halakhic life and norms when it records that the inanimate sanctified land of Eretz Yisrael cannot tolerate a lifestyle that is antithetical to the theme of “kedoshim tiheyu,” which is articulated in the pesukim beginning Parashat Kedoshim that immediately follow. While the Torah also alludes to and reiterates some of these motifs in the end of Kedoshim itself (20:22–24), this comparatively mild rendition serves to highlight the more graphic and transcendent treatment of Acharei Mot. When Acharei Mot and Kedoshim are read in tandem, the Torah reading itself sufficiently and satisfactorily conveys this vital dimension of the indispensability of “kedoshim tiheyu” and the disastrous ramifications of its absence, rendering the unpleasant reading of Yechezkel chapter 22 superfluous. [It is noteworthy that many chumashim erroneously printed the haftarah of Yechezkel chapter 22 in conjunction with Acharei Mot, and linked Amos chapter 9 with Kedoshim. See Machatzit Ha-Shekel, op cit. These pairings are logical, especially as parallels. However, Chazal’s decision may reflect a more ambitious parshanut objective, as we have posited.]

Moreover, the context of Acharei Mot’s forceful rejection of alternative cultures and lifestyles affords an opportunity to effectively accentuate an equally important aspect of the aspiration to internalize kedushah and imitate Hashem. The conjunction of the parashiyot accentuates the fact that this capacity and obligation to pursue kedushah uniquely characterizes Kelal Yisrael and distinguishes them from other nations. As a “mamlekhet kohanim” and “goy kadosh,” the destiny of Kelal Yisrael is always singular; its relationship with Hashem endures even periods of transgression and betrayal; its ultimate redemption is guaranteed, notwithstanding all the travails and vicissitudes in the uneven course of Jewish history. This theme is magnificently captured precisely in the chapter of Amos chapter 9, the choice haftarah for Acharei Mot-Kedoshim, as previously noted. Although this approach fails to explain the ruling of R. Akiva Eiger, it does account for the intriguing ruling of the Mordechai and Rema. Chazal’s complex position regarding the haftarah pairings of Parashat Kedoshim constitutes an impressive if subtle contribution to the illumination of the pivotal multidimensional theme of “kedoshim tiheyu.”