Early K’riat Shma

The Mishnah debates the latest time for the nighttime k’riat shma but appears to be unanimous in giving a limit for the earliest time, which the gemara understands to be a reference to tzet ha-kokhavim. If that is the case, it calls into question the widespread practice of davening ma’ariv in shul before dark, complete with k’riat shma. This practice is discussed already by the rishonim.

Rashi asserts that indeed k’riat shma is not fulfilled before dark, and thus must be recited again later in the evening. However, that need is adequately addressed by the recitation of k’riat shma al ha-mitah. The reason it is recited in shul, then, is to place the amidah in a context of divrei Torah, a function similar to ashrei at minchah. (This idea is founded on a statement in the Yerushalmi.)

Tosafot objects strongly to Rashi’s postion, noting four reasons k’riat shma al ha-mitah would seem to be inadequate for the biblical obligation. Rather, it must be that the recitation in shul is effective. Reconciling that thesis with the limitation of tzet hakokhavim, the Ri suggests that the actual starting time for k’riat shma is somewhat earlier, following alternative opinions found in the gemara.

Rabbeinu Tam, however, offers a different suggestion, connecting this situation to a ruling issued later in the masekhta. R. Yehudah and chakhamim argue as to when the latest time for minchah is, presumably also the earliest time for ma'ariv. R. Yehudah pegs this time at p'lag ha-minchah, and the chakhamim at shkia. The gemara concludes the matter in an usual manner, ruling that following either view is acceptable. Rabbeinu Tam suggests applying this ruling to k'riat shma. Shma can be recited early, due to the opinion of R. Yehudah, and even though minchah is still davened after p’lag, that can be explained by the opinion of chakhamim, and the gemara has ruled that both opinions are acceptable.

The Sha’agat Aryeh (#3) found the position of Rabbeinu Tam to be highly objectionable. He notes that the Talmud’s license to choose either opinion was given in the context of prayer, not shma. As prayer is a rabbinical obligation, the flexibility is understandable, due to the principle of s’feika d’rabanan l’kula. Sh’ma, however, is a biblical obligation, and would need to be treated stringently. The application of that ruling to shma indicates that Rabbeinu Tam believes shma to be a rabbinical obligation, against the accepted understanding. For this reason, the Sha’agat Aryeh rejects his explanation. (See also Resp. Beit haLevi, I, 9, who addresses another issue, the assumption that the latest time for minchah, and the earliest time for shma, which work off of different criteria, would be interrelated.)

However, a different analysis than that assumed by the Sha’agat Aryeh might be possible. The Steipler Gaon, in an essay in his work on Masekhet Berakhot (Kehilot Yaakov, 1) proves through comparisons made by rishonim that there are two ways to understand the Talmud’s license to choose either opinion. It might be a function of safek (as the Sha’agat Aryeh assumes) or it might instead be a function of p’sak, recognizing the right to follow a different view, as long as that view is adhered to honestly and consistently. This latter possibility should apply to laws that are d’orayta as well as d’rabanan (Compare the glosses of R. Yehudah Bachrach, printed in the back of the gemara, to this Tosafot). .

The Steipler uses this analysis to consider the question of whether one may change practices from day to day as far as which prayer can be fulfilled in the time between plag and shkiah. If the Talmud’s ruling is a function of lenient approach to a safek, it would be legitimate to change from day to day based on convenience. If, however, it is based on variances in p’sak, intellectual honesty would mandate that one of the two views be followed consistently.

The Kogaglover Rav (Resp. Eretz Tzvi I, 86) advances an innovative theory to explain Rabbeinu Tam’s application of the Talmud’s ruling to a d’orayta law. The Ritva (Yevamot 14a) states that despite the existing rules governing concepts d’orayta and d’rabannan, an exception exists if one is not applying a preexisting dispute to a current situation, but rather considering the actual object, for example an actual item of food, that was argued about by Tannaim or Amoraim. In that event, one has the right to follow either of the opinions. This notion, maintains the Kogaglover Rav (basing himself on a statement by the Mishneh L’Melekh, Ishut, ch. 5), can be applied to this discussion because all of time is on a continuous cycle. Thus, the p’lag haminchah we discuss in modern times is the same as that discussed directly by R. Yehudah and Chakhamim, and we have the right to follow either opinion, whether the issue is d’orayta or d’rabannan.

R. Natan Gestetner (Responsa L’Horot Natan, II, 78) offers two suggestions to explain why Rabbeinu Tam’s interpretation, which seemingly allows two contradictory behaviors (davening minchah late and k’riat shma early) is not an example of tartei d’satrei (an internal contradiction). One, perhaps we are only concerned with a tartei d’satrei when it would result in the nullification of an obligation or a prohibition. In this case, both obligations are performed fully, and the extension of their applicable time zones is actually as much of a stringency as it is a leniency (for reasons he explains in his responsum). Further, perhaps tartei d’satrei is only a concern when one is analyzing an issue logically, and the internal contradiction would thus negate the logic. If, however, the behavior is driven not by logical analysis but by the license of the Talmudic ruling, this issue would not apply.