The Ri, in Tosafot (2a), states that the melakhah of “hotza’ah” (carrying from one domain to another) requires more explanation and source derivation than do other melakhot because hotza’ah is an “inferior melakhah” (melakhah geruah). The Ohr Zarua (Hil. Shabbat 82, citing Rabbeinu Tam) writes that this is because no change takes place in the object, which is identical to what it was before the melakhah began.

In further explaining this status, it appears that Tosafot and the Rashba take different approaches. The authors of the Tosafot focus on the fact that there would seem to be no distinction between carrying from one private domain to another and from carrying from a public domain to a private domain. The Rashba directs his explanation toward the fact that a heavy object brought from one corner of the room to another would result in no transgression, while a small object taken from a private domain to a public one would be prohibited.

R. Asher Weiss (Minchat Asher, Shabbat, 1) suggests that these two approaches may reflect two understandings in the prohibition of carrying on Shabbat: is the issue the lifting of an object and transporting it from one place to another (as implied by the Rashba), or the changing of its domain of location (as is the impression given by Tosafot)?

He posits as a test case the question of one who lifts an object while in a private domain, and then places it down in the place it came from, but only after the walls have been removed, creating a public domain. According to the first approach, it is possible that no hotza’ah has taken place, as the object was not moved at all. According to the second approach, it may be that hotza’ah did take place, as the domain in which the object was located has changed.

The status of inferior melakhah has several possible consequences. Tosafot write that the toldot of hotza’ah need a source, as opposed to other melakhot, because of this status. The Chayei Adam (Hil. Shabbat 9:11) states that an object that has been illicitly carried on Shabbat may still be used, in contradistinction to other melakhot which taint the object with a rabbinical prohibition (see also Biur Halakhah 318:1). R. Betzal Ashkenazi (Responsa, 41) asserts that while one who violates other melakhot is eligible for punishment if he receives a general warning (hatra’ah), in the case of hotza’ah the melakhah must be named in order for the warning to be effective. Further, some rishonim understand that the reason the Talmud says that eiruvin are not required for Yom Tov is that hotza’ah falls short of the status of a melakhah as relevant to Yom Tov. [See also Afikei Yam, II, 4:8.]