One of the most contentious issues to discuss around the time of Pesach is the question of kitniyos. Nearly every Jew has his or her own “take” on this peculiar minhag. Sefardim look at those Ashkenazim struggling with rice deprivation and laugh, mockingly. Then there are those who insist that the only food that should be consumed on Pesach is matza, banning all other foods for fear of kitniyos. Of course, it is only a matter of time before matza itself becomes problematic. On the other end of the spectrum, which is many ways a reaction to the aggrandizement of kitniyos, are those wishing to put an end to the minhag once and for all (this author’s wife is in that camp). Recently, a Facebook group under the name of “Kitniyot Liberation Front” has sprung up. With all the challenges facing the Jewish people today, it is good to know that there are those fighting the war to “liberate” us from kitniyos. With two extreme views as to how to approach this minhag, the middle road would seem to be the ideal. In this article, we will review and analyze a well-known teshuva written by Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l, one of the most important deciders of halacha in the past 100 years. He offers a very novel and unique approach to this issue, and understanding his position may not necessarily bring the opposing camps together, but at the very least present a compelling sevara as to how to view this entire minhag. Before reviewing the teshuva, it is imperative to separate the two issues that are perturbing about this minhag. The first has to do with its source, meaning the rationale for the entire minhag. While this is an important issue, it is not the subject of this article, nor the teshuva. The second issue surrounds the application of the minhag. There seem to be no true objective standards, inconsistencies abound, and one can sympathize with an overall sense of disillusionment. Rav Moshe begins his teshuva (OC 3:63), which was written to answer whether one may consume peanuts on Pesach, citing the position of the Terumas HaDeshen. According to this opinion, the issue of peanuts was problematic, as one could make flour from it, and it seemed it was planted in fields like other kitniyos (which could lead to them being mixed up with grains). Rav Moshe writes that to apply this position across the board is untenable. First of all, to maintain that all foods that can be made into flour are problematic is an impossibility. Every food, one could argue, has this feature! Furthermore, we know potatoes are permitted, yet they are paradigmatic of foods that can be transformed to flour. Regarding the second feature of kitniyos, there are several other foods that possessed the characteristic of being planted like other kitniyos, and even are extremely difficult to distinguish from grains, yet were not prohibited (he cites the Magen Avraham, the Taz and the Chavos Yair). Finally, we see the Rema prohibited mustard seeds, even though these have neither of the two characteristics described by the Terumas HaDeshen. Rav Moshe now makes his move. First, he says all we can rely on to prohibit are those foods that clearly were treated as forbidden, and these foods are well known and publicized (one thing unclear is which time period is he specifically referring to). Second, he explains that this minhag is a unique minhag in that it was not a takana, or edict, enacted by a collection of poskim. Instead, people took upon themselves not to eat these foods for the above two reasons cited by the Terumas HaDeshen. But these actions did not rise to the level of a true takana. Beyond this, one can posit with complete confidence that the only food restricted were those actually present at the time. Therefore, potatoes could not have been prohibited, as they were not around during that era. When potatoes became abundant, the chachamim of that generation did not want to treat them as something prohibited. One reason he offers is because potatoes were a staple (other acharonim such as the Aruch HaShulchan offer this same rationale). The second reason is that the entire basis for the minhag of kitniyos is in and of itself weak. It was referred to as “minhag shtus” by Rabbeinu Tam, a pretty strong condemnation. Furthermore, once something becomes prohibited, it becomes nearly impossible to permit it again at a future time. This reasoning can be applied to other types of species that share characteristics with kitniyos, where the prohibiton was not established. The same logic therefore applies to the peanut. Whereas some may have a personal minhag not to eat peanuts on Pesach, out of safek we should not prohibit them. Therefore, one should give a hechsher stating it should not be mixed with chameitz, and those whose minhag is to eat peanuts can eat them. The same holds true for peanut oil. Before attempting to define Rav Moshe’s approach, it is interesting that he does not treat the minhag of kitniyos with the same deference as other acharonim. Many poskim, while not quite amazed at the basis for the minhag of kitniyos, nonetheless insist the minhag be maintained and that it would be disastrous to separate oneself from the kahal (excluding Sefardim of course) and eat kitniyos on Pesach. Rav Moshe does not seem to share this same concern, as he clearly does not make use of this rationale. Furthermore, one can clearly deduce from Rav Moshe that all derivatives of the kitniyos, such as oils, would be permitted. What is his approach? The initial way of looking at kitniyos is that they are defined with certain intrinsic features. Being made into flour is a characteristic of food, and how it is planted is a feature of its growth. Any food then with either of these two characteristics belongs in the species of kitniyos. And if the definition is intrinsic, derivatives as well would be problematic. Rav Moshe clearly points out the difficulty with such a sevara. Instead, Rav Moshe seems to draw a line. Whatever was defined as kitniyos (when exactly is unclear) retains that definition. At the same time, once that definition is expressed, nothing new can or should be added. In essence, Rav Moshe is saying that there is an abstract idea of kitniyos. An example of such a phenomenon would be maror. The Talmud cites numerous species that are defined as maror. If today we discovered something that produced the same effect as maror, we would not be able to give it that definition. It would just be a sharp food. Therefore, there is an abstract quality to maror – it is not a species of food, but a conceptual definition. The same can be said by kitniyos, according to Rav Moshe. There was a period of time when kitniyos came into existence. At a certain point (this is the one difficult part to his position – when exactly was this moment?), no more kitniyos can be added. Therefore, even if there was a food today that possessed the features of kitniyos, we cannot create that definition in the food. However, this also means that whatever is kitniyos today retains that definition. In one fell swoop, we see how Rav Moshe is able to thread a line between the two extremist positions. He uses a halachic mechanism to retain the minhag. And part of retaining the minhag, based on his logic, is NOT to add any more kitniyos. Once we start adding, we revert to the initial approach, and such a position does not seem halachically relevant. So let’s put aside our desire to pile on the kitniyos until we are left with a piece of cheese to eat on Peach. And let’s relax with the loud rhetoric about being “liberated” from kitniyos. While this sensible halachic approach may not satisfy either side of this debate, it should at the very least cool the heated emotions and help us focus on the more important and essential ideas of Pesach.